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The author analyses the arbitration policy, arguing that international commer-
cial arbitration has become the dominant method of settling international trade
disputes. International agreements brought international value of arbitral awards
that is actually higher than the international value of court decisions. Further-
more, he stresses the most successful process of international harmonization of
arbitration rules and statutes pertaining to arbitration world wide, in which
process the UNCITRAL enactments have played a prominent role. The author
also takes into consideration the contractual restriction of judicial review and the
issue of extension of judicial control by party agreement, pointing out to the certain
disorientation and difficulties that could emerge in that regard.
Key words: abitration policy, UNCITRAL, harmonisation of arabitration
rules and statutes, contractual restriction of judicial review, extension of judicial
control by party agreement
A) A STRONG POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION...
It has been known (and repeated quite frequently) that United States courts
have espoused a “strong pro-arbitration policy”1. This principle has often
inspired the rhetoric swing of judges and scholars who speak about the “reversal
* Professor Tibor Várady, Ph. D., Central European University, Nador u. 9, 1051 Budapest,
Hungary, and Emory University, 1301, Clifton Road, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
1 The leading case which articulates this policy is the Supreme Court’s decision in Moses
H. Cone Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24, 25 (1983)
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of old hostility” (of courts towards arbitration) and it has also inspired a most
considerable number of court decisions in which unclarities and imperfections
were disregarded in order to give a chance to the arbitration process. According
to the frequently cited words of the Supreme Court decision in the Moses H.
Cone case: “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
resolved in favor of arbitration”.2 The pro-arbitration stance is very much present
outside the United States as well. Scholars and practitioners often take a
combative pro-arbitration attitude. Sometimes one has the impression that
some brave fighters may not have been informed that the war is all but over.
We won. There is practically no more hostility, international commercial
arbitration has become the dominant method of settling international trade
disputes, courts do not view arbitration as an enemy anymore, not even as a
rival, but rather as a rescuer who will assume part of the increasingly heavy
load of crowded dockets. International agreements (first of all the New York
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards3) have
brought about an international value of arbitral awards that is actually higher
than the international value of court decisions. We have also witnessed a most
successful process of international harmonization of arbitration rules and
statutes pertaining to arbitration world wide (in which process the UNCITRAL
enactments - the 1976  UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the 1985 UNCITRAL
Model Law - have played a prominent role).
Arbitration (and international commercial arbitration in particular) is not
an orphan anymore. It is not an infant either. It is still an institution which
deserves support and recognition. However, the environment and the context
have changed. Within the new setting of a consolidated environment it is some-
times not easy to establish what is support for arbitration, what is “pro-arbi-
tration”.  A few decades ago - prior to the adoption of Article II of the New
York Convention - when the issue arose whether courts should be obliged to
refer to arbitration the parties who have executed a valid and viable arbitration
agreement, it was not difficult to perceive what was pro-arbitration. Likewise,
it was clearly pro-arbitration to push for the recognition of the clause compro-
missoire  in addition to the compromis. In a similar vein, partisans of international
commercial arbitration were practically unanimous in advocating the
2 See Note 1)
3 Done in New York, June 10, 1958, ratified by 121 countries according to the UNCITRAL
update of June 8, 2000
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separability of the arbitration clause from the rest of the contract. Or, to take
another example, it was not difficult to tell that the drive to reduce the variety
of recourses against arbitral awards to basically two (setting aside and opposition
to recognition and enforcement) was, indeed, pro arbitration; and so was the
endeavor to restrict within these two recourses the number of possible grounds
on which an arbitral award may be challenged.
After the main battles have been won, we are facing today a different world
of issues. The separability of the arbitration clause from the rest of the contract
is generally accepted, but the question arises should one allow separability
within the arbitration clause.4 Divorcing provisions which endanger the viability
of the arbitration agreement might save the basic understanding of the parties
to submit their dispute to arbitration; but it might also undermine the confi-
dence of the parties in the arbitration process, because this confidence is based
on the understanding that arbitration will only take place if the parties so
agree, and it will be conducted in conformity with the provisions of party
agreement.
Particularly sensitive issues have recently come to the fore in connection
with the range of judicial review. One of the emerging questions is whether it is
in the interest of arbitration to disregard annulments pronounced in the country
where the award was made. Another issue which has gained prominence (and
has given rise to controversies) is the dilemma about the possibility of party-
designed judicial control. This manuscript endeavors to investigate problems
emerging in connection with the limits of judicial review, focusing in particular
on the question whether parties to an arbitration agreement may expand judicial
review by party stipulation.
After the limited grounds on which recognition and enforcement of an award
may be opposed became standardized on the basis of the New York Convention,
the question has arisen as to whether it is in line with the interests of inter-
national commercial arbitration to recognize awards which were properly annu-
lled in the country where they were rendered?5 The Hilmarton6 cases and the
4 See, Varady, Arbitration Despite the Parties, in “Law and Reality, Essays on National and
International Procedural Law”, M. Nijhoff Publ.,1992, 351-376
5 Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention clearly allows refusal of recognition on this
ground
6 In Hilmarton v OTV a Geneva award denied a claim for consulting fees on the under-
standing that the contract violated Swiss public policy. The award was recognized in
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Chromalloy7 decision show that the answer is not easy. One could argue that
recognition even of those awards the acceptance of which is not mandated by
the New York Convention is arbitration-friendly since it gives even more credit
to foreign awards than the standard set by the Convention. But there is the
other side of the coin. Vacatur in the country of origin of the award allows new
arbitral proceedings and a new (possibly different) award in the same case. If
the first award were recognized in spite of annulment, we may wind up with
two different awards in the same case, both with a chance of world wide recog-
nition. This is one of the lessons from the Hilmarton cases, and this result is
not arbitration-friendly. In Hilmarton, the first arbitral award (which went in
favor of OTV) was recognized, and this was confirmed by the 1994 decision of
the Cour de cassation8. But the case had many ramifications. While the first
recognition proceedings were ongoing, the award was set aside in Switzerland
- and later, the Swiss court decision declaring annulment was also recognized
in France. After this, a new award (in favor of Hilmarton) was rendered in
Switzerland, and this award was also recognized by the Nanterre Tribunal de
grande instance, which decision was confirmed by the Versailles Cour d’appel9.
The Cour de cassation has eventually found a way out of this disarray, and brought
about some (belated) consistency. On June 10, 1997, the French Supreme
Court dismissed and cancelled both Versailles decisions, based on a recourse
submitted by OTV10. The Cour de cassation held that the existence of an
irrevocable French decision (that on recognition of the first award) prevents
the acknowledgment in France of an incompatible arbitral or judicial decision
rendered in the same subject-matter. The story has had, however, further epi-
sodes. In 1999, the English Commercial Court recognized and declared enfor-
ceable the second  Hilmarton award - the one that was issued in favor of
Hilmarton11. This is clearly at odds with the end-result  reached in  France,
France in spite of the fact that setting aside proceedings were already initiated in Switzer-
land. A series of conflicting court decisions followed which shall be mentioned further on.
7 Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Egypt, 939 F. Supp. 907 (1996)
In Chromalloy an award rendered in Egypt was set aside by an Egyptian court, but it was
nevertheless recognized in the U.S.
8 Cass.1e civ.March 23 1994, Reported in Revue de l’Arbitrage, 1994, 327
9 The Versailles decision was rendered on June 29, 1995. Reported in Revue de l’Arbitrage,
1995, 639
10 Cass.1e civ., June 10, 1997, Reported in Revue de l’Arbitrage, 1997, 376
11 Mealey’s International Arbitration Reports, May 26, 1999
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where the first award (the one that denied recovery to Hilmarton) was recog-
nized and became res judicata. The position taken by the English Commercial
court is not incompatible with the New York Convention, since this Convention
does not give extraterritorial force to court decisions granting or denying recog-
nition. All court decisions in the Hilmarton case show deference toward arbitra-
tion, yet the result is confusing and does not help the reputation of the arbitra-
tion process. In hindsight one might ask whether it would not have been more
pro-arbitration to show less deference at the outset, to stay the first recognition
proceedings  in accordance with Article VI of the New York Convention, and
to observe the outcome of setting aside procedures in Switzerland.
Voicing doubts about the recognition of annulled awards, W. Park states:
“Deference to good faith annulments often furthers the very same interests as enforcement
of the arbitration agreement and award: holding the parties to their bargain. Just as an
agreement to arbitrate in London means driving to hearings on the left side of the road,
so it means that proceedings are subject to the English Arbitration Act.”12 (There is a
caveat here, a suggested distinction between “good faith annulments” and other
than good faith annulments, but the point  remains the same: deference to
annulment of an award rendered in a country recognized as relevant country
under the New York Convention, may arguably show more loyalty towards the
arbitration agreement than deference to the /annulled/ award.)
The pro-arbitration trend is still quite strong in both practice and scholarly
writings. Victories scored during the past decades have bolstered (and broade-
ned) the ranks of partisans of arbitration. It appears, however, that issues which
are nowadays on the agenda, and which attract wide attention, are typically not
issues which yield easy distinctions between partisans and opponents. Most
participants in the debates clearly gravitate toward the pro-arbitration side, and
identify it as “our side”; but the question emerges “which side is our side”?.
B) PARTY INTERFERENCE WITH THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW
After the boundaries of judicial review of arbitral awards have been reduced
and have become settled (following the norms of the New York Convention
12 William Park, Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration, 93 American Journal of
International Law, 805, at page 814.
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and the standards set by the UNCITRAL Model Law), a situation was created
which is basically consistent with the aspirations of international commercial
arbitration. There remain, of course, unresolved questions, and some of them
still consequential.
B.1) Contractual restriction of judicial review
One of the emerging questions is whether the grounds on which judicial
scrutiny of an award may be initiated represent a numerus clausus, or whether
the grounds set by the lex arbitri are subject to party interventions. Most arbi-
tration acts are silent on this matter, but since the pertinent norms are manda-
tory norms, they appear to be beyond the reach of the parties. Also, when the
legislator sets standards of a minimum scrutiny, it clearly marks a territory
which cannot be narrowed by party agreement. Still, some legislators have
allowed party intervention to a limited extent. The examples are all examples
of further limitation of judicial scrutiny. The 1987 Swiss Private International
Law Act allows the parties to waive or restrict the recourse of annulment, but
only if none of the parties have their domicile, habitual residence, or business
establishment in Switzerland.13 This solution received a mixed response14. Tu-
nisia followed the Swiss solution.15 Endeavoring to create a most favorable
climate for international arbitration, Belgium went even a step further. It was
stated in the 1985 Judicial Code, that a Belgian court may only hear a request
for annulment if at least one of the parties had relevant ties with Belgium. (In
other words, a possible exclusion of annulment was not left to the parties,
13 According to Article 192(1) “If none of the parties have their domicile, their habitual
residence, or a business establishment in Switzerland, they may, by an express statement
in the arbitration agreement or by a subsequent written agreement, waive fully the action
for annulment, or they may limit it to one or several of the grounds listed in Article 190,
subsection 2.”
14 See HEINI, KELLER, SIEHR and others, IPRG Kommentar Zürich 1993. In his comment
on Article 192, K. Siehr, states that Article 192 belongs to the “most controversial”(wohl
umstrittensten)norms of the Swiss Act. He adds that it is doubtful whether it will achieve
its goals. (page 1612)
15 According to Article 78(6) of the 1993 Tunisian Arbitration Code: “The parties who
have neither domicile, principal residence nor business establishment in Tunisia may
expressly exclude totally or partially all recourse against an arbitral award.”
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setting aside was excluded ex lege, if none of the parties had Belgian nationality,
residence, or seat in Belgium.) While too much judicial control impedes the
arbitration process (and discourages the parties to resort to arbitration), some
judicial control may inspire confidence in the arbitration process16.  On a second
thought, the Belgian legislator made a step back, and in the May 19, 1998
modifications of the Belgian Judicial Code it adopted a Swiss type solution
(the only difference is that Article 1717(4) of the Belgian Act only allows the
parties to waive the action for annulment, it does not foresee a possibility of
restricting it to some grounds)17. The Belgian hesitations show that we have
reached a point where it becomes debatable whether less judicial control and
more party governance are, or are not in line with the interests of arbitration.
The same hesitations have put forward another proposition the content of
which is opposite, but touches upon the same problem, that of the limits of
judicial review. The question has arisen whether parties can expand judicial
review? Here, the framework of the discourse has not been set by legislative
initiatives, but rather by court interpretation of party stipulations. The option
of expanding judicial review by party agreement is the issue to which I would
like to devote more attention in this manuscript.
B.2) Extension of judicial control by party agreement?
B.2.a) A case which prompted wide attention
The possibility of extending (rather than restricting) judicial control by
party agreements was tested by a sequence of conflicting decisions of  Califor-
16 A most sensitive situation arises with regard to awards denying the relief sought. In this
situation - assuming that the arbitration took place in Belgium between non-Belgian
parties - setting aside was excluded, and opposition to recognition and enforcement did
not offer a last opportunity for judicial control. In the ensuing situation, the winning
party is satisfied with the res judicata effect and has no reason to seek recognition and
enforcement, while the loosing party has no recourse available for challenging the award,
not even on ground of violation of due  process.
17 According to Article 1717(4):”Les parties peuvent, par une déclaration expresse dans la
convention d’arbitrage ou par une convention ultérieure, exclure tout recours en annulation
d’une sentence arbitrale lorsqu’aucune d’elle n’est soit une personne physique ayant la
nationalité belge ou une résidence en Belgique, soit une personne morale ayant en Belgique
son principal établissement ou y ayant une succursale.”
462 Tibor Várady: On the Option of a Contractual Extension of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards...
nia courts in the same case. The case was not the first of this kind in U.S.
practice18, but it presented the options and dilemmas in a ripened form, and it
inspired a portentous number of scholarly comments and scrutinies. A dispute
between LaPine Technology Corporation (a U.S. corporation) and Kyocera (a
Japanese company) was settled by an ICC arbitration award issued on August
24, 1994. Kyocera was ordered to pay $257 million19 to LaPine. The winner
moved to confirm the award before the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California. Kyocera opposed confirmation, and moved to “vacate,
modify and/or correct” the award. Under the 1925 U.S. Federal Arbitration
Act (hereinafter: “FAA”) confirmation may be denied - and a motion to vacate
may be granted - on grounds stated in Para. 10. What made this case special
was a  provision in the arbitration agreement of the parties. Section 8.10(d) of
the “Definitive Agreement” of the parties stated:
“The United States District Court for the Northern District of California may enter
judgment upon any award, either by confirming the award or by vacating, modifying or
correcting the award. The Court shall vacate, modify, or correct any award: (i) based
upon any of the grounds referred to  in the Federal Arbitration Act, (ii)where the
arbitrators’ findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence, or (iii)
where the arbitrators’ conclusions of law are erroneous.” (emphasis supplied)
It is clear that this provision attempted to expand statutory judicial review.
It added two important grounds on the top of those stated in the FAA. One
may argue that such provisions are ill-advised and may jeopardize some com-
parative advantages of the arbitration process, such as speed or finality.20 The
18 See Fils et Cables d’Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp.584 F.Supp.240 (S.D.N.Y.
1984);Gateway Technologies v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir.
1995); Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun Times, 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir.1991).
In Fils and in Gateway the court allowed party-designed extended judicial review, in
Chicago Typographical the 7th Circuit held that parties cannot contract for judicial review
of arbitral awards.
19 The figure of $257 million is stated in Mealey’s Arbitration Reports, July 1996 (7 Mealey’s
Int’l Arb. Rep.9)
20 See T. Cullinan, Contracting for an expanded scope of judicial review in arbitration agree-
ments, 51 Vand.L.R.395 (1998) Cullinan advances arguments pro and con expanded
judicial review, his conclusions are stated at p. 428; Smit takes a strong position against
expanded judicial review (H. Smit, Contractual modification of the scope of judicial
review of arbitral awards, 8 American Review of International Arbitration, 147, 1997);
Jiang-Schuerger also takes a critical position (Di Jiang-Schuerger, Perfect Arbitration =
Arbitration plus Litigation? 4 Harvard Negotiation Law Review 231,1999);
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really difficult question is what serves better the interests of arbitration once
the (arguably undesirable) provision is here and it has to be faced. Should it be
disregarded? (can it be disregarded?), or should it rather be followed as part of
the arbitration agreement.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California came to the
conclusion that the parties could not expand the statutory limitations of judicial
review because “this would  amount to statutory amendment by private person”.
In its decision of December 11, 199521 the District Court endeavored to find
an interpretation which would foster rather than hamper the cause of arbitration,
and decided to disregard the provision which purported to expand statutory
judicial review. Judge Ingram stated:
“It appears to this court that the contractual provisions existing in this case wherein
the parties choose and specify the scope of judicial review to pertain in their arbitration
is offensive to the public policy which supports arbitration and those aspects of arbitration
which are beneficial to the parties as well as to the courts whose responsibilities are eased
by alternative forms of dispute resolution.”22
Following Judge Ingram’s line of reasoning, the basic benefits of arbitration
from the point of view of the parties (and from the point of view of the judicial
system as well) are matters of public policy, which deserve protection even
against some elements of the party agreement itself. Following this line of
thinking the District Court restricted its review to the grounds stated in the
FAA, found that those were not infringed, and confirmed the award.
Upon appeal, the 9th Circuit23 followed the same pro-arbitration inspiration,
but it wound up with a different analysis. Kyocera argued that its position was
in line with the interests of international commercial arbitration, because the
District Court’s decision may place in jeopardy “the ability of parties to multi-
national arbitrations to rely on the enforceability of their written agreements”.
Judge Fernandez held that the FAA does not prevent enforcement of agreements
to arbitrate under different rules than those set forth in the Act itself, and
A somewhat different position was taken by Hochman who argues that in some cases -
labor cases in particular - an expanded judicial review may be a desirable choice (S. A.
Hochman, Judicial review to correct arbitral error - an option to consider, 13 Ohio State
Journal on Dispute Resolution 103,1997 - conclusion stated on p.120).
21 909 F.Supp.697
22 909 F. Supp.697, 705
23 United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, Decision of September 18, 1997, 130
F.3d 884
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concluded: “Indeed, such a result would be quite inimical to the FAA’s primary purpose
of ensuring that private agreements to arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.”24
In the same vein, Judge Fernandez stressed that court can expand their review
if parties so agree. “To do otherwise would make hostility to arbitration agreements
erumpent under the guise of deference to the arbitration concept.”25
In his concurring opinion, Judge Kozinski expressed caution, saying “I find
the question presented closer than most”. He continued; “In general, I do not believe
parties may impose on the federal courts burdens and functions that Congress has with-
held.”26 He added, nevertheless, that the Court must enforce arbitration agree-
ments according to their terms. Judge Kozinski found important that the terms
of the party-designed extended review were reasonable. He stated: “I would call
the case differently if the agreement provided that the district judge would review the
award by flipping coin or studying the entrails of a dead fowl.”. He concluded that
“given the strong policy of party empowerment in the Arbitration Act” the
given provision on extended judicial review was probably not against the policy
of the Arbitration Act.27
Judge Mayer dissented. In his opinion, parties may specify contractually
whether to arbitrate, how to arbitrate, and when to arbitrate, but they cannot
dictate how a court must review an arbitral award. In Judge Mayer’s opinion,
should the parties desire more scrutiny, they can contract for an appellate
arbitration panel, but they cannot contract for an expanded judicial review.28
The case was returned to the District Court, which rendered a new decision
on April 4, 2000.29 This time, the Court conducted an extended review of
findings of both facts and law in line with the terms of the arbitration agreement,
but stated that in its review of the factual conclusions reached by the arbitrators,
the Court will apply a deferential “substantial evidence” standard. The District
Court held that the arbitrators did not make any errors of law, and their con-
clusions were supported by facts. The motion to vacate was denied, and the
award was confirmed.
This end result has actually averted a host of potential problems. The text
of the arbitration clause was fully observed, an enlarged scrutiny was conducted,
24 130 F.3d 884, 888
25 130 F.3d 884, 889
26 130 F.3d, 884, 890
27 130 F.3d, 884, 890
28 130 F.3d 884, 890
29 2000 WL 765556 (N.D.Cal.)
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and the original award was not changed. Other possible outcomes may have
given rise to more dilemmas. In order to be able to evaluate the impact of a
party-designed enlarged scope of review on the arbitration process, more options
need to be investigated. On the following pages, I would like to identify some
options, and implications of these options, following two basic hypotheses: 1/
party agreement on expanded judicial review is disregarded (as it was by the
District Court); and  2/ party designed expanded judicial review is accepted (as
held by the 9th Circuit).
B.2.b) Hypothesis 1): Party agreement on expanded judicial review is disregarded
If the provisions of the arbitration agreement on expanded review are being
held invalid, the first and biggest question is that of the impact of this finding
on the arbitration agreement as a whole. The District Court dwelled on this
issue, but did not perceive it as a difficult one. It cites only one case, and this
is one in which severance was denied on ground that the clauses of the arbi-
tration agreement which were “blatantly illegal” were part of an “integrated
scheme” to contravene public policy30. The District Court held that Kyocera
was distinguishable, and found that the invalid provision is divorceable, because
it deals with review of the arbitration procedure conducted by court, while the
rest of the arbitration agreement is devoted to arbitration procedure conducted
by the arbitrators. On ground of these considerations, the District Court
concluded that “The contents of Para. 8.10(d)(ii) of the Definitive Agreement are
clearly severable.”31
The arguments advanced by the parties suggested another line of thinking
which the District Court chose to avoid. Kyocera pointed out that the disputed
provision was an integral part of the arbitration agreement, and that there was
no basis to suppose that the parties would have agreed to arbitrate at all, absent
that provision. In turn, LaPine argued that Kyocera would have agreed to arbi-
trate even without this provision, rather than to subject itself to the financial
liability and hazard of trial by jury. It is difficult to justify the sidestepping of
this issue and controversy. It is common ground in most legal systems that an
invalid provision may, but need not affect the rest of the contract. Whether it
30 Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Products Co. 43 F.3d 1244 ((9th Cir. 1994)
31 909 F. Supp. 697, 706
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will, depends on the rules of contract construction, and guidelines provided by
national laws. These guidelines usually invite a scrutiny of the basic purpose of
the contract (would it remain the same if the contested clause was separated?),
or of the intentions of the parties (would they have concluded the contract
without the provision in question?). To cite some examples, in the 1978 Yugoslav
Act of Obligations (which has been incorporated into the Croatian legislation
with minor changes) a special article has been devoted to the issue of partial
nullity. According to Article 105: “Nullity of a contractual provision shall not
imply nullity of the entire contract, if it can stand without the null provision,
and should such provision be neither a requirement for the contract nor a
decisive motive for making it.” The Swiss Code of Obligations focuses on the
question whether the parties would have or would not have concluded the
contract without the provision which was set aside.32
Had the question been faced, it would have given rise to a difficult and
complex scrutiny. If the parties accept arbitration on the condition that issues
of law and fact remain subject to court review33, can we hold that a consent to
arbitrate exists even without this provision? LaPine argues that from Kyocera’s
point of view, this is probably still better than trial by jury, which is, in all
likelihood, much more alien to a Japanese party. But this is, of course, specu-
lation. Speculating further, one has to note that Kyocera had another option -
not to conclude the contract at all, if it did not include an arbitration agreement
of his liking. Hans Smit argues that “it would appear appropriate” to conclude
that had the parties realized that the provision on scope of review was invalid,
they would have accepted the arbitration agreement without it as well. He also
offers an alternative reasoning yielding the same result: “Alternatively, the strong
32 According to Article 20(2) “ Si le contrat n’est vicié que dans certaines de ces clauses, ces
clauses sont seules frappées de nullité, à moins qu’il n’y ait lieu d’admettre que le contrat
n’aurait pas été conclu sans elles.”
33 In Kyocera, the same condition also appeared in the wording of the terms of reference
adopted by the ICC Tribunal. This may be relevant considering Article 28(6) of the 1998
ICC Rules (which is essentially identical to Article 24(2) of the 1988 Rules). Article
28(6) states that by submitting the dispute to ICC Rules, the parties “shall be deemed to
have waived their right to any form of recourse insofar as such waiver can validly be
made”. The argument could have conceivably been made that this provision of the ICC
Rules overrides the specific party stipulation on a particular recourse. This argument - a
difficult one anyway - lost most of its foothold after the provision on expanded judicial
review was repeated in the adopted terms of reference.
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policy favoring arbitration embodied in the applicable arbitration statute may be given
substance by endorsing that conclusion.”34. This logic is contested by Judge Fernandez
from the 9th Circuit who stresses that disregarding the clause on expanded
review would yield “hostility to arbitration agreements under the guise of
deference to the arbitration concept”. We are back to the initial question:
What is actually pro-arbitration under the given circumstances? Would arbi-
tration become a more appealing or less appealing option if the parties knew
that their arbitration agreement would be upheld even if some parts of it were
declared invalid?
In a similar case decided by the Paris Court d’appel  (decision of October 27,
1994. in Société de Diseno v. Société Mendes35) the parties inserted into their
arbitration clause a provision stating that they retain the right to lodge an
appeal against the arbitral award before the court of appeal.36 After the award
was rendered, Diseno appealed, but alternatively also moved to set aside on
ground of nullity of the arbitration agreement. The 1981 French Code of Civil
Procedure limits recourses against awards rendered in France in international
arbitral proceedings to setting aside (Article 1504); appeal remains a possibility
in domestic cases. Diseno tried to cover all grounds. It suggested the case to be
qualified as a domestic case, which characterization would allow appeal. The
alternative motion to set aside was based on another theory: the case is an
international case, the provision on appeal is void, and thus the arbitration
agreement is also void, which yields annulment. The Cour d’appel de Paris found
that the case was an international case, and held that the parties could not
create a recourse outside the Code of Civil Procedure.37 The question arose as
to whether the arbitration agreement (and the award) may survive the nullity
of the provision of the arbitration agreement on expanded review. The Cour
d’appel held that the provision on appeal constituted an “essential element” of
34 Smit, Op. cit. 152
35 Reported in Revue de l”Arbitrage, 1995, 263
36 The clause read: “les parties se réservent toutefois le droit de faire appel de la sentence
arbitrale devant la Cour d’appel”.
37 “Considérant qu’en conséquence seul est ouvert contre les sentences rendues en France
en matière d’arbitrage international le recours en annulation selon les modalités prévues
par les articles 1504 et 1502 du nouveau Code de procédure civile, à l’exclusion d l’appel,
les parties a un arbitrage international n’ayant pas le pouvoir de créer une voie de recours
que la loi impérative du pays où  elles ont entendu situer le règlement conventionnel de
leur litige ne prévoit pas;” (Revue de l’Arbitrage, 1995, at p.266)
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the arbitration agreement by which the parties intended to submit their dis-
pute to “two levels of jurisdiction” (which intention became frustrated), and
that under these circumstances the whole arbitration clause was invalid.38
The predicament of the distinction between domestic and international
arbitration  left its imprint on another French case which reached the Cour de
cassation. In Société Buzichelli Holding v. Hennion39 the dispute arose between
two French subcontractors in connection with works executed outside of France.
(In Diseno v. Mendes, the international character of the dispute was more
obvious. One party was French, the other Spanish, while the subject of the
dispute was distribution of French goods - products of Yves Saint-Laurent - in
Spain.) In the Buzichelli case, both parties were French, both wanted to qualify
the process as domestic arbitration, and were ready to embark, on appeal
procedures under articles 1484 and 1485 of the French Code of Civil Procedure
which envisage domestic arbitration. The Cour d’appel  qualified the case ex
officio as an international case, and annulled the award. The Cour de cassation
upheld this qualification, holding that party autonomy does not extend to the
qualification of the nature of arbitration process as domestic or international.
In his note on this case, Patrice Level40 raises the question whether a better
solution were to adopt the “souplesse” of the 1987 Swiss Private International
Law Act, which allows the parties to choose domestic regime of arbitration
(and cantonal law) instead of the regime of the Private International -Law Act
itself.41 (Such a switch, of course, makes only sense if the applicable lex arbitri
recognizes separate regimes for domestic and international arbitration.)
One could ask whether upholding the contested provision on expanded
judicial review in Diseno was more or less difficult than following the disputed
provision in Kyocera. In Diseno, the parties did not interfere with the pattern
of judicial control, they did not try to rewrite the grounds on which a recourse
against arbitral awards may be lodged. Instead the parties relied on a different
type of recourse, not recognized in international arbitration, but accepted in
38 “Considérant que cette clause est en conséquence frappée d’une nullité qui affecte dans
son ensemble la convention d’arbitrage dont elle constitue un élément essentiel,
déterminant du consentement des parties qui ont ainsi affirmé leur volonté de soumettre
leur litige à deux degrés de juridiction;” (Revue de  l’Arbitrage, 1995, at p. 267
39 Decision of the Cour de cassation of April 6, 1994, Reported in Revue de l’Arbitrage,
1995, pp. 263-264
40 Revue de l’Arbitrage, 1995, 267, at p. 270
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domestic arbitration. Suppose the parties did not try to introduce a new type
of recourse, but attempted to modify the existing one. Following the gist of the
decision of the Cour d’appel, the result would probably remain the same. The
French court insists on the mandatory nature of the French provisions, and
stresses that the only recourse permitted is “setting aside according to the
modalities provided in Article 1504 and 1502 of the New Code of Civil Pro-
cedure”. This implies that the grounds set and limited in Article 1502 are
beyond the reach of the parties, different modalities cannot be designed by
party agreement.
Another question that may be raised with respect to the Diseno case is,
whether reliance on the doctrine of estoppel could have tilted the court toward
rescuing the arbitration agreement - and the award. (Diseno was the party who
initiated arbitration and the one who tried to  rely at the same time both on
the validity of the provision on appeal, and on the invalidity thereof.) If estoppel
may have rescued the award in this case, it does not provide a general solution.
Depending on the circumstances of the case, estoppel may or may not become
an issue; and if it becomes an issue, it may or may not influence the decision.
The key issue remains the same: can the arbitration agreement survive the
annulment of its provision on extended judicial review? In his comments on
the Diseno case, Level asks whether priority should be given to the intention
of the parties to arbitrate (and to consider as non-existent the provision on
appeal) or should one give more weight to the mistrust the parties expressed
towards arbitration without judicial supervision.42 What is in the interest of
the cause of arbitration? The position taken by the District Court in Kyocera
may very well be qualified as being more “pro arbitration” in the given case,
because it saves an arbitration agreement (although it sacrifices some parts of
it). But is it “pro arbitration” in the long run? The confidence of the parties in
the arbitration process is very much based on the assumption that the terms of
their agreement will be followed. Would parties have more or less confidence
in arbitration if they knew that arbitration would validly proceed even if some
terms of their bargain could not be observed?
41 According to Article 176(3): “The provisions of this chapter shall not apply where the
parties have agreed in writing that the provisions of this chapter are excluded and that
cantonal provisions on arbitration shall apply exclusively.”
42 Level, Op. cit.273
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If one follows the option to disregard party agreement on expanded judicial
review (as the District Court in Kyocera did), one has to reckon with an uncertain
fate of the arbitration agreement proper. The strong policy favoring arbitration
may offer some backing, but it will certainly loose at least some of its strength
when arbitration which needs support is not the same as the one designed by
the parties. It is probably impossible to agree on a firm principle covering all
cases. The question boils down to contract interpretation, and the circumstances
of the case - along with the rules and policies of the forum - will probably lead
to different decisions in different cases within the same country, and even
more so in different countries. In other words, in the broad arena of international
commercial arbitration, there is no guarantee that the arbitration agreement
will survive the invalidity of its provision on expanded judicial review.
Staying with the hypothesis that the District Court’s decision remains final,
a new jeopardy might emerge if recognition is sought in another country. Su-
ppose Kyocera’s assets are in Japan, and LaPine is compelled to seek recognition
and enforcement in Japan. Kyocera objects, and states, referring to Article
V(1)(d) of the New York Convention, that the arbitration agreement was not
observed. (It provided for an extended appeal, and this provision was disre-
garded.) In this hypo, a strict reading of Article V(1)(d) might provide a narrow
escape. The New York Convention permits denial of recognition if the “arbitral
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties” (emphasis
supplied). In our case, the agreement of the parties was infringed with regard
to the “post arbitral procedure”. Such a case would represent an interesting
challenge to the construction of Article V(1)(d).
B.2.c) Hypothesis 2): Party agreement on expanded judicial review is observed
It appears that the voidance of the provision on extended judicial review
reduces the arbitration agreement to a precarious position (unless the applicable
lex arbitri would explicitly allow a contractual extension of judicial review -
and I am unaware of any arbitration act which would do so). Let us follow now
the other hypothesis, represented in the position taken by the Ninth Circuit,
which allowed review of the arbitral award observing the heightened standard
agreed by the parties. The “Definitive Agreement” provided for extended
grounds for “vacating, modifying or correcting the award” - allowing “va-
cating, modifying or correcting” not only on grounds stated by the FAA, but
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also “where the arbitrator’s findings are not supported by substantial evidence”,
or where “the arbitrator’s conclusions of law are erroneous”. Under Paragraph
11 of the FAA, modifications and corrections are only possible in technical
matters. This is consistent with the idea of limited review restricted essentially
to formal grounds; and confines the outcome of court scrutiny to essentially
two options: confirming or setting aside the award. The court is not posited as
an appellate level which can change the decision on the merits. The 9th Circuit
did not address this point head on, and did not raise the question of a possible
modification of the merits of the award. (The problem has not emerged later
either, since after rehearing the case, the District Court confirmed the award
instead of setting it aside or modifying it). Nevertheless, since the holding of
the 9th Circuit approves the whole text of Article 8.10(d) of the “Definitive
Agreement”, it follows that modification of the award became one of the con-
templated options. This may give rise to a further problem (in addition to the
fact that it is difficult to reconcile this position with Article 11 of the FAA).
Suppose the District Court modified the award, and held that - instead of
$257 million as awarded by the ICC Panel - Kyocera owes LaPine let us say
$163 million from the moment of the ICC award, and that in turn, LaPine
owes Kyocera $35 million from the moment of the decision of the District
Court. How should one qualify the product? Is this still an arbitral award
within the purview of the New York Convention, or is it simply a court decision?
Could LaPine seek recognition and enforcement of the hypothetical holding of
the District Court in another country on the theory that this is an arbitral
award? Could Kyocera seek recognition of the part of the “arbitral award”
which goes in its favor, or set it off against the portion of the decision which
goes in favor of LaPine? Or would in turn the original ICC award still have a
chance if submitted for recognition outside the U.S.? Once again, the wording
and the concepts of the New York Convention would be put on a difficult trial.
Article I(2), recognizing both ad hoc and institutional arbitration, gives (at
least indirectly) a definition of arbitral awards:
“The term ‘arbitral awards’ shall include not only awards made by arbitrators
appointed for each case but also those made by permanent arbitral bodies to which the
parties have submitted.”
The bottomline is, that - either in an institutional or in an ad hoc setting -
arbitral awards are decisions made by arbitrators. One could very well argue
that this implies that a final decision made by a court (which decision departs
from the arbitrator-made award) may not be qualified as an “arbitral award”.
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Staying with the issue of the characterization of the “product”, the follow-
ing question also arises: When does the award become binding in case a
Kyocera-type stipulation if the arbitration agreement (which provides for ex-
tended judicial review) is sustained. Within a standard setting, the fact that
annulment remains a possibility does not prevent a party from seeking recog-
nition of the award in a New York Convention country. Recognition cannot be
denied on ground of Article V(1)(e) which allows refusal of recognition if “the
award has not yet become binding on the parties”43 If, however, the parties
agreed on an appellate level arbitration, recognition of the first level award
may very well be refused on ground of Article V(1)(e), since the award is not
final and binding yet. (At least not before the appeal was dealt with, or before
the time limit had expired.) Where does our situation belong? In Kyocera, the
parties agreed on an extended judicial control, which converts the standard
setting aside examination into a scrutiny of an appellate level. Arguably, con-
sidering the provision on expanded judicial scrutiny, the ICC award rendered
in Kyocera is not a “binding award”. Again, it is difficult to accommodate the
problem within the established conceptual framework of international com-
mercial arbitration, and this gives rise to uncertainties and disorientation.
Let us follow now some other possible implications of the holding of the
9th Circuit. The Appellate Court stated quite emphatically that the FAA does
not prevent the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate under different rules
than those set forth in the Act itself, and continued; “Indeed, such a result would
be quite inimical to the FAA’s primary purpose of ensuring that private agreements to
arbitrate are enforced according to their terms.”44 Judge Fernandez relied on the
decision of the Supreme Court in Volt Info. Sciences Inc. v. Board of Trustees
of Leland Stanford Junior University45 where it was held with regard to party
autonomy: “Just as they may limit by contract the issues which they will arbitrate, so
too may they specify by contract the rules under which  that arbitration will be conducted.”46
But the point is that what we have here, are party-designed rules specifying the
modalities of judicial review. The contested rules of the arbitration agreement
in Kyocera, are not “rules under which arbitration will be conducted”. The
43 Recognition proceedings may possibly be suspended if setting aside proceedings are un-
der way as defined in Article VI.
44 130 F.3d 884, 887
45 489 U.S. 468 (1989)
46 489 U.S. 468, 479
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question is whether we have here just “an agreement to arbitrate” defining the
powers of the arbitrators, or also an agreement about court proceedings, defining
the powers of the judges.
Even if one were to accept such a most extensive (and probably incorrect)
interpretation of the “agreement to arbitrate”, extending it to an agreement to
design court proceedings as a post-arbitral phase, the question emerges as to
what are the limits of party interference with the judicial proceedings. Judge
Kozinski was aware of the problem and qualified his concurring opinion by
stating that the present terms (review of findings of facts and of conclusions of
law) might be acceptable, but flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a dead
fowl might not.  In this comparison, the provisions of the actual party agreement
appear to be quite acceptable. But a host of variations is imaginable between
the provision of the “Definitive Agreement” and entrails of a dead fowl47. Once
you allow the parties to shape the judicial proceedings, the question arises
against what standards will one compare specific party provisions? Constitu-
tional standards of due process are an obvious touchstone.  Is this sufficient?
The “Definitive Agreement” stated that the award may be “vacated, modified
or corrected”, where “the arbitrator’s findings of fact are not supported by
substantial evidence”. The fact finding mechanism of ICC arbitration is quite
different from the fact finding procedures of California courts. The former is
essentially arbitrator-driven, the latter one is basically party-driven. Instruments
are different, or have different relative values. An appellate review supposes
control within a coherent system of compatible values. On rehearing the case,
the District Court of the Northern District of California tried to alleviate this
problem by applying a deferential “substantial evidence” standard in reviewing
facts. This is helpful in the given case, but the general problem of compatibility
remains. The standard structure of the whole mechanism is that of party-
designed arbitration supplemented with a  restricted judicial control carefully
drafted by the legislator. Elements of party-designed judicial control may
endanger the basic structure and balance.
47 In New England Utilities v. Hydro-Quebec, 10 F.Supp.2d 53 (D.Mass.1998) the court
decided to follow party agreement on expanded judicial review, but also stated - referring
to Judge Kozinski - that it need not do so. If the party provision would “require diversion
from the court’s normal mode of operation”. In the given case, the court found that
issues of law on appeal were “thankfully straightforward”, which tilted the court towards
allowing review of these issues.
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C) CONCLUDING REMARKS
The conclusion I would like to suggest is very simple. (And not very helpful
after an agreement on extended judicial review was already executed.) No matter
whether you accept the logic of the first decision of the District Court in Kyocera,
or whether you endorse the reasoning of the 9th Circuit, uncertainty,
disorientation, and serious problems will (or at least might) emerge.
The position taken by the District Court is compatible with the mandatory
character of norms on judicial control, and it is congruent with the fact that rules
on arbitration contemplate party autonomy regarding the arbitration process,
rather than with respect to judicial control of arbitration (unless some autonomy
regarding judicial control were explicitly permitted under specific conditions, as
stated in the Swiss, Tunisian and Belgian legislative acts). The position taken by
the District Court also appears to be closer to realities in the arena of comparative
law, as indicated by the French decisions. This position finds further support in
the UNCITRAL Model Law which has been setting standards of modern
arbitration acts, and which makes clear that the norms on judicial review are
mandatory. According to Article 34(1): “Recourse to a court against an arbitral
award may be made only by an application for setting aside in accordance with
paragraphs (2) and (3) of this article”. It follows that the only recourse permitted
is setting aside, and this recourse can only be relied upon in accordance with the
norms of the Act; i.e. in accordance with paragraph (2) of Article 34 which sets a
list of grounds for setting aside, and in accordance with paragraph (3) which
defines the time limit within which a motion to set aside may be submitted.  The
drawback of the logic followed by the District Court is that the arbitration
agreement becomes vulnerable. The outcome will depend on the specific content
of the provision on extended judicial control, and on subtle and rather
unpredictable interpretation of standards like “essential element of the agreement”,
“the purpose of the contract”, or “would the parties have concluded the agreement
without the contested provision”.
The position taken by the 9th Circuit appears to be more difficult to square
with statutory norms, yet it avoids the issue of the severability of the provision
on extended judicial control. At the same time, it leads us toward uncharted
ground regarding the range and character of possible party interference with
the judicial process; and tensions might very well emerge between structural
characteristics of arbitration and of judicial decision-making respectively, if
courts are posited as an appellate level to arbitration. A Kyocera type extension
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of judicial control might also yield court ordered modifications of the award,
in which case it becomes questionable whether the product is still an award,
and whether the benefits of the New York Convention remain available.
In sum, the basic problem is with the contractual provision itself. Party
agreements on expanded judicial review of arbitral awards are ill-advised. Pro-
-arbitration is the omission of this clause.
The Kyocera dilemma prompted further reconsiderations. After this manu-
script was submitted for publication, new decisions have been rendered. These
decisions have not introduced new options, but they have repeatedly
demonstrated how difficult it is to choose between the two existing solutions.
On July 23, 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reviewed the
April 4, 2000 and October 2, 2000 decisions of the District Court on remand.
(In these decisions, the District Court conducted an expanded review as agreed
upon in the arbitration clause, yet it confirmed the award nevertheless.) Upon
appeal, the Ninth Circuit conducted review within the same setting (expanded
review as agreed by the parties) - and it confirmed the award once again (299
F 3d 769 - 2002).
A more consequential new decision of the Ninth Circuit was rendered on
August 29, 2003 (341 F 3d  987). This decision did not follow the established
pattern, but reinvestigated once again the basic dilemma regarding party-desig-
ned judicial control. Rehearing the case en banc (without oral argument) the Ninth
Circuit completely reversed its position, and returned to the original (1995)
position of the District Court. In its 2003 decision, the Ninth Circuit held: “[f]ederal
courts may only review arbitral decisions on the grounds set forth in the Federal Arbitration
Act. Private parties have no power to alter or expand those grounds, and any contractual
provision purporting to do so is, accordingly, unenforceable.” (341 F 3d 1000). Having
taken this position, the Ninth Circuit had to investigate whether the provision in
the arbitration clause on expanded judicial review was separable from the rest of
the arbitration agreement. After a more thorough analysis than that of the District
Court in 1995, the Ninth Circuit held that the provision on expanded judicial
review was separable, because “the terms of the appellate review did not permeate other
portions of the arbitration clause”. (page 1001) The Ninth Circuit added: “Although
Kyocera asserts that the potential for expansive judicial review was critical to the entire
agreement, its briefs cite absolutely no evidence that supports this assertion.” (page 1002).
There was another attempt to reinvestigate the problem, but the Supreme
Court of the United States dismissed the petition for a writ of certiorari (124
S.Ct.980 - January 5, 2004).
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Thus, the basic problem with provisions on expanded judicial review re-
mains, but the option of recognizing and following such party agreements ap-
pears to be sidelined - at least in the Ninth Circuit.
Saæetak
Tibor Várady*
O MOGUΔNOSTI UGOVORNOG PRO©IRENJA SUDSKOG
PREISPITIVANJA ARBITRAÆNIH PRAVORIJEKA
Æelio bih sugerirati veoma jednostavan zakljuËak (a koji nije od velike koristi nakon
πto je sporazum o proπirenom sudskom preispitivanju veÊ proveden.) Bez obzira na to
prihvaÊamo li logiku prve odluke Saveznog okruænog suda (District Court) u Kyoceri
(Kyocera) ili se slaæemo s rezoniranjem 9. okruga (9th Circuit), pojavit Êe se (ili bi se
barem mogli pojaviti) nesigurnost, dezorijentacija i ozbiljni problemi.
Stav koji je zauzeo Savezni okruæni sud sukladan je obvezujuÊem karakteru normi o
sudskoj kontroli te se podudara s Ëinjenicom da pravila o arbitraæi imaju u vidu autono-
miju stranaka u pogledu arbitraænog procesa, viπe nego s obzirom na sudsku kontrolu arbitraæe
(osim ako izvjesna autonomija u pogledu sudske kontrole nije izriËito dopuπtena pod posebnim
uvjetima, kao πto je utvreno zakonskim aktima ©vicarske, Tunisa i Belgije). Pokazalo se da
je stav koji je zauzeo Savezni okruæni sud takoer bliæi realnosti na podruËju poredbenog
prava, kao πto pokazuju francuske odluke. Taj stav nadalje podupire UNCITRAL-ov
Model zakona koji postavlja standarde modernih arbitraænih akata i koji jasno pokazuje
da su norme o sudskom preispitivanju obvezatne. Prema Ëlanku 34 (1): “Sudska zaπtita
protiv arbitraænog pravorijeka moæe se traæiti samo tuæbom za poniπtaj u skladu sa stavcima
(2) i (3) ovoga Ëlanka”. Iz toga slijedi da je poniπtaj jedino dopuπteno pravno sredstvo te da
se to pravno sredstvo moæe koristiti samo u skladu s normama Zakona; tj. u skladu sa
stavkom (2) Ëlanka 34. koji navodi popis temelja za podnoπenje prijedloga za poniπtaj.
Nedostatak je naËina zakljuËivanja Saveznog okruænog suda πto arbitraæni sporazum postaje
povrediv. Rezultat Êe ovisiti o specifiËnom sadræaju odredbe o proπirenoj sudskoj kontroli te
o suptilnom i nepredvidivom tumaËenju standarda poput “bitan element sporazuma”, “svrha
ugovora” ili “jesu li stranke zakljuËile sporazum bez pobijane odredbe”.
* Prof. dr. sc. Tibor Várady, profesor, Srednjoeuropsko SveuËilliπte, Nador u. 9, 1051
Budimpeπta, Maarska i SveuËiliπte Emory, 1301, Clifton Road, Atlanta, Georgia,
Sjedinjene AmeriËke Dræave
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Stav koji je zauzeo 9. okrug teæe se uklapa u statutarne norme, pa ipak izbjegava
pitanje odvojivosti odredbe o proπirenoj sudskoj kontroli. Istovremeno vodi prema nezacrta-
nom terenu u pogledu opsega i karaktera moguÊeg uplitanja stranaka u sudski proces;
mogu se javiti i tenzije izmeu strukturalnih obiljeæja arbitraæe i sudskog odluËivanja
ako su sudovi postavljeni na prizivnu razinu prema arbitraæi. Kyocerski tip proπirenja
sudske kontrole mogao bi takoer dovesti do izmjena pravorijeka po sudskom nalogu, a u
tom sluËaju postaje upitno je li rezultat joπ uvijek pravorijek te ostaju li pogodnosti
Newyorπke konvencije i nadalje na raspolaganju.
Ukratko, temeljni problem je u samoj ugovornoj odredbi. Sporazumi stranaka o pro-
πirenom sudskom preispitivanju arbitraænih pravorijeka nisu preporuËljivi. Proarbitraæa
je izostavljanje te klauzule.
KljuËne rijeËi: arbitraæna politika, UNCITRAL, usklaivanje arbitraænih pravila i




ÜBER DIE MÖGLICHKEIT DER VERTRAGSERWEITERUNG DER
GERICHTSÜBERPRÜFUNG VON
SCHIEDSGERICHTSENTSCHEIDUNGEN
Ich möchte eine ganz einfache Argumentierung suggerieren (was jedoch nicht von
großem Nutzen ist, da die Vereinbarung über die Erweiterung der Gerichtsüberprüfung
bereits in die Tat umgesetzt worden ist). Ohne Rücksicht darauf, ob wir der Logik der
ersten Entscheidung des US-Bezirksgerichts (District Court) in Kyocera zustimmen oder
aber eher den Gedankengang der Entscheidung des Neunten Bezirks (9th Circuit)
nachvollziehen können, wird dies (oder könnte es immerhin) Unsicherheit, Verwirrung
und ernsthafte Probleme nach sich ziehen.
Die Stellungnahme des US-Bezirksgerichts ist in Einklang mit dem verbindlichen
Charakter der Regelung über die Gerichtskontrolle und stimmt mit der Tatsache überein,
dass die Normen über die Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit die Autonomie der Parteien in Hinsicht
 ** Tibor Várady, Professor an der Central European University, Nador u. 9, 1051 Budapest,
Ungarn and Universität Emory, 1301, Clifton Road, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
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auf das Schiedsgerichtsverfahren in größerem Maße beachten als in Hinsicht auf die Ge-
richtskontrolle der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit (außer wenn eine gewisse Autonomie in Hinsicht
auf die Gerichtskontrolle nicht ausdrücklich und unter besonderen Voraussetzungen erlaubt
ist, wie dies durch die Gesetzesakte der Schweiz, Tunesiens und Belgiens festgelegt wurde).
Es hat sich gezeigt, dass die Stellungnahme des US-Bezirksgerichts der Realität im Bereich
des vergleichenden Rechts näher ist, wie die französischen Entscheidungen es beweisen. Dieselbe
Einstellung ist auch im UNCITRAL-Modellgesetz vertreten, das die Standards moderner
Schiedsgerichtsakten setzt und das ausdrücklich deutlich macht, dass die Normen über die
Gerichtsüberprüfung verbindlich sind. Nach Art. 34 Abs.1: “kann der Gerichtsschutz
gegen die Schiedsgerichtsentscheidung nur durch die Klage auf Nichtigkeit in Einklang mit
Abs. 2 und 3 dieses Artikels geltend gemacht werden.” Daraus folgt, dass dieses Rechtsmittel
nur in Einklang mit den Gesetzesbestimmungen, d.h. in Einklang mit Art. 34 Abs. 2
eingelegt werden kann, in dem die Nichtigkeitsgründe angeführt sind, sowie in Einklang mit
Abs. 3, in dem die Zeitfrist angegeben wird, innerhalb derer der Antrag auf Nichtigkeit
gestellt werden kann. Ein Nachteil dieser Argumentierung des US-Bezirkgerichts ist in der
Tatsache zu suchen, dass die Schiedsgerichtsvereinbarung infolgedessen anfechtbar ist. Das
Ergebnis wird vom spezifischen Inhalt der Bestimmung über die Erweiterung der
Gerichtskontrolle abhängen sowie von der subtilen und unvorhersehbaren Deutung der
Standards (wie etwa “wesentliches Vertragselement”, “Vertragszweck” oder die Frage, ob
“die Vereinbarung ohne die angefochtene Bestimmung geschlossen wurde”).
Die vom Neunten Bezirk eingenommene Einstellung, die sich schwerer in statutarische
Normen einfügen lässt, weicht jedoch der Frage nach der Trennbarkeit der Bestimmung
über die erweiterte Gerichtskontrolle aus. Gleichzeitig begibt sie sich hinsichtlich des
Umfangs und des Charakters der eventuellen Einmischung der Parteien in den Gerichts-
prozess auf ein nicht fest umrissenes Terrain; es kann auch zu Spannungen zwischen
strukturellen Merkmalen der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und der gerichtlichen Beschlussfassung
kommen, wenn die Gerichte der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit als Berufungsinstanz gegenüber-
gestellt werden. Die Erweiterung der Gerichtskontrolle nach dem Muster von Kyocera
könnte außerdem zur Änderung des Urteilsspruchs von Amts wegen führen, in welchem
Fall es fraglich ist, ob es sich um ein Urteilsspruch handelt und ob die Vorteile der New
Yorker Konvention weiterhin aufrechterhalten bleiben.
Kurz gesagt, das Grundproblem liegt in der Vertragsbestimmung selbst. Die Vereinba-
rungen der Parteien über die Erweiterung der Gerichtsüberprüfung von schiedsrichterlichen
Entscheidungen sind nicht zu empfehlen. Pro Gerichtsbarkeit heißt Weglassung dieser Klausel.
Schlüsselwörter: Schiedsgerichtpolitik, UNCITRAL, Anpassung der Schiedsgerichts-
vorschriften und des Statuts, Vertragseinschränkung der Gerichtskontrolle, Vertragser-
weiterung der Gerichtsüberprüfung von Schiedsgerichtsentscheidungen Georgia, USA
